

Networks of Recruitment: Fiscal-military Operations to Contract Foreign Soldiers for Sweden, 1605 -1610

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Introduction

ON 17 September 1605, at the battle of Kirkholm, Sweden suffered one of the worst defeats in its military history. The Swedish army was decisively routed by a smaller Polish-Lithuanian force, suffering up to 8,000 casualties; half its military strength and over 1% of the total male population. This disaster sparked a major shift in Swedish military policy as Sweden became increasingly dependent on foreign troops to provide manpower and expertise to continue the war.¹

The scale of recruitment was unprecedented, and the cost immense. Compared to smaller recruitments in the sixteenth century, the Swedish Crown was beset by new administrative, logistical, diplomatic and economic challenges that had to be overcome. This complex operation involved multiple state and private agents in various countries. Besides finding, vetting, equipping and transporting the required officers and soldiers, the Crown needed to manage foreign relations and complex commercial transactions on an international level in order to get the men, materials and money when and where they were needed. Problems of overseas communication and coordination were immense and were not helped by mutual distrust between the king and his new foreign partners.

In spite of these difficulties, the Crown succeeded in establishing a working administrative framework, and new international networks, through which

1 About 20–26 % of Swedish casualties were foreign troops, depending on how Livonian soldiers are calculated. Neuding Skoog and Frost claim 36 % of Swedish losses as foreigners, but based on number of units rather than men. Mankell 1865, 11, 20–21, Appendix 8; Barkman 1939, 524-525, 542-544; Frost 2000, 62-65; Lindegren 2000, 133; Neuding Skoog 2017.

7,000-9,000 soldiers were recruited from Western Europe by 1611, when the outbreak of war with Denmark stymied the operation.² These troops enabled Swedish imperial expansion in the eastern Baltic Sea region and influenced economic, societal and diplomatic developments. This also established an important precedent, and twenty years later these same organisational models and experience were applied, often using the same individuals and networks as in 1605–1610, for the much larger recruitments of the Thirty Years' War.³

Despite its significance, this transformative recruitment has been largely overlooked compared to those of Gustav II Adolf and his successors, or the smaller operations of the sixteenth century.⁴ In Swedish historiography, recruiting operations have also been subordinated to a supporting role in other discourses. Military historians have primarily been interested in the institutional and organisational development of the 'national' army.⁵ Economic and political histories have instead focused on the connection between resource extraction and warfare in the burgeoning fiscal-military state, yet have paid insufficient attention to expenditure and the connection between national resource flows and international mercantile networks.⁶

In recent years these national outlooks have been questioned. Naval historians in particular have embraced the concept of the 'contractor state' for explanations of the intersection of public and private spheres in mobilising military resources.⁷ Regarding the army, David Parrott and Peter H Wilson have emphasised the significance of the international military market.⁸ Fritz Redlich's classic study, *The German military enterpriser and his work force*, also remains salient regarding the recruiting mechanics of continental enterprisers.⁹ However, the foremost body of literature on early seventeenth century overseas recruitment to Sweden are the works of Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch regarding long-standing Scottish-Swedish interactions.¹⁰

2 See Appendix 1. Recruits from Germany and the Baltic Sea region are excluded. Due to the fragmentary nature of records, it is difficult to say how many recruits actually arrived. Dunning and Hudson claim that 6,000 Irish alone were recruited, although most apparently deserted en route. Grosjean 2003, 29; Dunning and Hudson 2013.

3 Björklund 2021.

4 Sörensson 1932; Barkman 1936; Barkman 1939; Redlich 1964; Ekholm 1971; Landberg 1971; Parrott 2012. For the sixteenth century: Tawastjerna 1918-1920; Kreem 2001; Neuding Skoog 2017; Neuding Skoog 2018.

5 Barkman 1939; Korhonen 1939; Nilsson 1989.

6 Lindegren 1985; Nilsson 1990; Lindegren 2000; Glete 2002; Hallenberg 2009; Glete 2010; Hallenberg and Holm 2016.

7 Fynn-Paul, 't Hart and Vermeesch 2014; Torres Sánchez 2016, 3-12.

8 Parrott 2012; Parrott 2014; Wilson 2020a; Wilson 2020b; Wilson and Klerk 2020.

9 Redlich 1964.

10 Grosjean 2003; Murdoch 2003; Murdoch 2006; Murdoch and Grosjean 2014. For recruitment from Ireland see Dunning and Hudson 2013.

This paper aims to build upon this existing research by combining disparate strands and presenting a holistic picture of this recruitment operation. For this purpose, empirical data has been collected for all of the thirty-two identified recruitments undertaken between 1605–1610 from Western Europe, which are presented in Appendix 1.¹¹ This data includes previously studied cases as well as hitherto overlooked French recruitments. Analysis of the multiple recruitments is broken down into three parallel processes - military, financial and diplomatic - which are looked at separately, and together. The focus is on recruitment via Älvsborg - Sweden's sole North Sea port and fiscal-military bottleneck for the operation - from the British Isles, the Netherlands and France, comparing the recruitment from these different regions within the same operational framework. This integrated approach permits a more comprehensive study of Swedish recruitments than previous regional studies have allowed.

Recruitment was dependent on international military, economic and social networks, as well as reliable and efficient partners that knew how to operate them. This paper argues that, although the preference was to use established networks, success of the delicate operation required adaptability and the capacity to renew existing ties and forge new ones. Building trust and reliability was crucial, since these attributes were needed to overcome many of the problems faced by recruiters. To arrive at this goal, a combination of contractual standardisation, operational streamlining and external guarantors were employed.

The recruitment network

The recruitment of thousands of replacement soldiers in the wake of Kirkholm was hardly a smooth process. The Swedish administration was in a state of panic, the army was in a shambles and Swedish efforts to levy domestic replacements met with limited success. A Polish invasion seemed imminent, and it was feared that a fifth column of dissidents would use popular resentment of the war to foment an uprising to return King Sigismund III of Poland back to the Swedish throne.¹² Foreign troops were urgently needed to prevent further collapse.¹³

11 Recruitment from Germany and the Baltic Sea region is excluded due to the increased scope of such a project, and because it occurred within a separate logistical framework than the North Sea recruitments.

12 Sigismund Vasa had been crowned king of both Sweden and Poland-Lithuania. However, using anti-Catholic sentiment Duke Karl fomented rebellion against his nephew and usurped the throne after a civil war (1597-1600). Karl was recognised as sovereign by the Riksdag in 1604 and crowned 1607.

13 Lappalainen 2009, 40-52, 101-110, 199-223. Avoiding unrest amongst native populations resulting from conscription was an important motive for using foreign forces, especially in overseas campaigns. Linnarsson 2015, 68-69.

By the start of the seventeenth century, Sweden already had a long history of using foreign soldiers. The bulk of its recruits had traditionally come from northern Germany and Scotland - regions with close commercial and social ties to Sweden, easy maritime access and an abundance of volunteers for military service.¹⁴ However, in this instance it was clear that traditional networks would not suffice. The net would have to be cast wider, finding new recruiters in established areas and extending recruitment to new regions: the United Provinces, France and England.

At the start of 1606, Swedish commissaries were sent to jump-start recruitment in the United Provinces. During their long war with Spain, the United Provinces had become a 'school of war' where officers learnt the latest skills of their trade, acquired reputation and formed professional networks. The commissaries tapped into these networks to enlist officers and veterans in the area, and their connections abroad. Amsterdam rapidly became the continental hub for the operation, through which most of the French and Dutch recruits, and some English and Scots recruits, passed on their way to Sweden.¹⁵

Besides the challenge of extending the recruitment network, the increased scale caused complications for logistics, finance and administration, stretching Swedish resources to the maximum. In past recruitments, the operation had been largely outsourced to enterprising officers, Swedish financial and administrative involvement had been small-scale, and the burden could be borne within the constraints of the normal system.¹⁶ Between 1606 and 1610 the cost alone was such that new means of financing had to be conceived. As will be shown later, this required significant administrative efforts and close collaboration with both existing and new mercantile networks.

The scale of this recruitment was sufficiently large to carry diplomatic significance. Whereas smaller recruitments had been possible clandestinely, the levy of thousands of men could not be ignored. Without foreign approval, conducting recruitment would be much more difficult, and officers wishing to remain loyal to their monarchs would refuse to enter Swedish service. As detailed below, gaining permission for recruitment drives was an undertaking in itself, which required the concerted effort of Swedish diplomats, commissaries, recruiting officers and foreign magnates sympathetic to the Swedish cause.

Each of these elements - military, fiscal and diplomatic - had to be addressed for recruitment to succeed. Sweden relied heavily on private agents and their

14 Hannula 1931, 195; Grosjean 2003, 11-21.

15 Parrott 2001, 29; Parrott 2012, 89-95; Dunthorne 2013, Chapter 3; Wilson and Klerk 2020.

16 Recruitments of foreign soldiers in the previous decade consisted of hundreds, not thousands of men. In the 1590s only three Scottish units were present, numbering at most 538, 581 and 80 men. Krigsarkivet, Militieräkningar, 1582/3, 1592/15.

networks: officers, merchants and nobles. The civil administration was also harnessed to support this operation, with the governor of Älvsborg, Söffring Jönsson, acting as gatekeeper for resource flows in and out of the country. Although Karl IX retained overall control, the long distances and slow speed of communication meant that responsibility had to be delegated. Swedish commissaries sent to the United Provinces took an active role directing and assisting recruitment. A generalised view of this organisation is presented in Figure 1.

Before looking at the sub-processes of recruitment, an overview of how the operation progressed is necessary (see Appendix 1 for commissions issued). As mentioned, the beginning of the operation was marked with frantic efforts to recruit as many men as possible, using existing networks while forging new ones. In this chaotic situation, Karl IX issued several very large commissions to key recruiters, as well as smaller company level commissions to recruit veterans serving in the United Provinces. Some of these early recruitments succeeded,




Figure 1: General outline of the Swedish recruitment network 1606-1610

with several companies reaching Sweden by the summer of 1606. However, many more failed. Multiple officers were unable to deliver the promised men, while others proved uninterested or disappeared from the scene for other reasons. Moreover, the recruitment ran into diplomatic difficulties. James VI & I and Henri IV were reluctant to lend their support and the States General of the United Provinces, resentful of Swedish competition, set restrictions for the export of troops from its territories.

By 1607 Swedish agents had a better understanding of the situation and, with the help of foreign magnates contacted the previous year, escalated the operation. James Spens, the largest Scottish recruiter, had received his commission in 1605 but still failed to deliver the promised men. Disenchanted with the Scots, Karl IX instead directed resources to French recruiters. However, French recruitment also stalled due to problems with funding and poor communications, and new Dutch measures to prevent the export of troops created additional hurdles.

Due to Dutch intransigence, the focus of recruitment shifted back to France and the British Isles. Diplomatic missions to the French and Stuart courts 1608-1609 were successful, greatly facilitating the export of troops from these territories. Around the same time, financing recruitment became easier thanks to a new network of Dutch merchants established in Sweden as the Gothenburg Trade Company. Finally, the conclusion of the Dutch-Spanish Twelve Years' Truce in 1609 eased military tensions in the United Provinces, resulting in the opening of borders and removal of the final obstacle in exporting troops to Sweden.

Most of the recruitments initiated 1605-1607 were finally completed between 1608 and 1610. New commissions were issued, mainly to officers already in Swedish service, to reinforce existing units. It seems likely that Sweden would have undertaken additional recruitments, but this was curtailed by political events: outbreak of war between Sweden and Denmark in 1611, the severing of the logistical link through Älvsborg, the assassination of Henri IV in 1610 and the death of Karl IX the following year. The expense of the war against Denmark and subsequent indemnity were heavy burdens which finally put an end to the large-scale recruitment operation of 1605-1610.

Recruitment process

The core process of recruiting new units involved finding and vetting recruiting officers, negotiating their contracts, employing subordinate officers, NCOs and common soldiers, providing necessary equipment, food and lodging for the men prior to first muster, and arranging shipping to Sweden. Much of this process was outsourced to entrepreneurial recruiting officers. However, often

overlooked is the supporting role of royal agents. As will be shown, Swedish commissaries dispatched into the recruitment area contributed by monitoring the process, communicating between stakeholders, ensuring the quality of officers and men employed, managing finances and assisting in other ways.

Finding and vetting recruiters

The first phase of the process was to find the right officers: competent, loyal and well-connected men. Trust, based on reputation, was essential. Although many officers seeking employment emphasised experience and ability, for Karl IX the first priority was to ensure the trustworthiness and loyalty of his officers and their subordinates.¹⁷ Besides being wary of recruiting Catholics, Poles and Danes, the Swedes had to consider which officers actually possessed the means to succeed in recruitment.¹⁸ Indeed, Karl's concerns were not unfounded: of twenty-two commissions granted 1605-1607, seven recruitments failed entirely and ten were only partially completed or severely delayed.¹⁹

Because of concerns over loyalty and trustworthiness, recruiters were primarily sought within existing networks. The preference was for officers who had already proved themselves in Swedish service. Scottish captain Samuel Cockburn (in service since 1598) was involved in two separate recruitments during this period, while the venerable William Ruthven (in service since 1579) was also brought in to assist.²⁰ Tried and tested, with connections to the Swedish army and society, they could be expected to be committed and loyal.

Next in preference came officers known to the Swedish Crown or recommended by someone close, with good reputation and established qualities, such as wealth, social standing, a body of troops ready, or a history of successful recruitments. The preference was for members of the high nobility who were well-connected, reputable and had access to funding. Karl IX approached these men directly with letters and by sending his commissaries to recruit them. Many also contacted the king on their own initiative after learning of the opportunity through their own networks.²¹

The first commissions that were issued in 1605 reflected these practices. Sir

17 For officers petitioning to be taken into service, see Riksarkivet, Skrivelser till konungen, Skrivelser till Karl IX (henceforth StK): Robert Taylor to Karl IX 18 March 1606, Sieur de Sueilles to Karl IX 17 July 1606, Pepyens to Karl IX 13 August 1607, François des Essars to Karl IX 17 September 1608, Bernhard Sasoubre to Karl IX (no date).

18 Tallett 1992, 101; Björklund 2022 [forthcoming].

19 Appendix 1.

20 Riksarkivet, Riksregistratur (henceforth RR), Karl IX to Henrik Falkenberger and Jöns Nielson 28 May 1606. The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database (henceforth SSNE), SSNE 1721, SSNE 4177 and SSNE 4219.

21 Trim 2002, 81-85; Ash 2010, 5-10.

Richard Barker, who had served in the Swedish army, was asked to oversee recruitment in England.²² Scottish recruiter James Spens, Baron of Wormiston, and his brother David were known to the king.²³ Sweden had often recruited Scots in the past, and they enjoyed a good reputation as both trusted recruiters and good soldiers. Consequently, Karl IX had high hopes that Spens would continue this 'unofficial alliance', as Alexia Grosjean calls it, by speedily recruiting 1,600 infantry and 600 cavalry.²⁴ The third recruiter, Gaspard III de Coligny, Seigneur de Châtillon, was of unknown quality. However, Karl IX had fostered good relations with Huguenot magnates and, as commander of the French detachment in Dutch service, Châtillon was an obvious candidate, whom Karl requested as his lieutenant general.²⁵

As it was clear that existing networks would not suffice to recruit the required number of men in such a short space of time, Karl IX put great effort into broadening existing networks and forging new ones by actively seeking recruiters amongst officers in the United Provinces, and by building relations with foreign magnates and asking for their help in finding men. Swedish commissaries played an important role in this part of the process; finding recruiters and vetting them to ensure their quality and trustworthiness.

The commissaries had no difficulties in sourcing candidates, but the quality of the first group contacted in 1606 was poor. Captains François de Serrant and David Reignier did not have the number of men they had claimed, Reignier was caught embezzling funds from the Dutch, and Serrant got arrested for trying to recruit from Prince Maurice of Nassau's lifeguard. Don Rodrigo de Córdoba y Guzman proved able to deliver as promised but, suspicious of his loyalties, the commissaries made enquiries about his background. Prince Maurice's commendation seemed enough to assuage doubts but the Dutch apparently wanted to rid themselves of this adventurer who had fallen foul of the Spanish governor of Santo Domingo before serving the French and Dutch with little distinction. Two years later he was discharged from Swedish service as well.²⁶

Recruiters contracted after 1606 were more reliable, which was perhaps due to better screening and less haste. Many candidates were turned down and, although the commissaries continued to report on problems with the ongoing

22 StK, Richard Barker to Karl IX 9 April 1605.

23 SSNE 1156. SSNE 1642; RR, Karl IX to James Spens October 1605.

24 Grosjean 2003, 15-16; Fischer 1907, 48.

25 Appendix 1.

26 RR, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson 26 April 1606; Riksarkivet, *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 31 May 1606 and 5 June 1606. *Petitot* 1822: 182, *Lettre de M. Jeannin à M. de Villeroy* 28 January 1608. Riksarkivet, *Riksregistraturet*, vol. 103, 1606-1610 *latinskt reg.* (henceforth *LatRR*), Karl IX to Don Rodrigo de Córdoba y Guzman 2 May 1608.

operations, their issues related to the process rather than the recruiters themselves. Swedish efforts to build new networks also bore fruit, as can be seen from the petitions written by French officers which frequently referred to someone already contracted who knew them.²⁷

Support was also forthcoming from the high nobility contacted by Karl IX. Although Châtillon was not himself willing to travel to Sweden, he allowed his subordinate Jean d'Azemar, Sieur de Sueilles to enlist in 1606, and recommended Henri De la Borde de Luxe in 1607.²⁸ Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, Duke of Bouillon and Prince of Sedan, also reciprocated Karl's advances by recommending Josiah Baron de Tessier for Swedish service.²⁹ In the British Isles Karl IX was for a long time confident that established networks would suffice but, when unexpected difficulties arose, quickly reverted to similar methods of seeking the backing of local magnates. George Gordon, 1st Marquis of Huntly, was asked to assist in Thomas Karr's and Robert Kinnaird's recruitments, and Patrick Stewart, Earl of Orkney, became guarantor of the recruitment conducted by his half-brother William Stewart.³⁰

Recruitment contracts

After preliminary discussions it was time to sign the contract which the officers did either in person, or by sending their lieutenant to Sweden on their behalf. The contract consisted of three different documents: the contract itself, called a 'stipend' or 'commission,' which specified the terms of recruitment, a patent in which the recruiter was appointed commander of the recruited troops, and which worked as a certificate of proof of serving the Swedish king, and the obligation, in which the recruiter swore loyalty to the Swedish Crown. Together these documents guaranteed the safety of both parties' interests.³¹

Contracts varied in their content and level of detail. All contained the basic technical detail of recruitment, including number, type (infantry, cuirassiers, etc.) and organisation of the units, recruitment area, when and where the units were to be presented and what sort of monetary compensation the recruiter would receive. Some commissions covered not only recruitment, but subsequent service as well, including provisions for payments and currencies, how often musters were to be held, compensations for lamed or captured soldiers, rights to ransoms

27 StK, François des Essars to Karl IX 17 September 1608, Bernhardus Sasouer to Karl IX, Pepyens to Karl IX 13 August 1607, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 13 August 1607.

28 LatRR, Karl IX to Monsieur Châtillon 18 June 1607.

29 LatRR, Karl IX to Henri Duc de Bouillon 4 April 1607, 8 March 1608 and 9 March 1608.

30 LatRR, Karl IX to the Marquis of Huntly 17 January 1607 and 21 January 1607, Karl IX to William Stewart 17 November 1607 and 9 January 1608, Karl IX to the Count of Orkney 9 January 1608.

31 Redlich 1964, 217.

and booty, legislation within units and terms for terminating the contract.³²

Infantry was recruited in companies of 200 while cavalry companies consisted of between 100 and 150 troopers. Captains were commissioned to recruit single companies, but more commonly colonels were contracted to recruit multiple companies for one or more regiments.³³ Regiments were typically five or six companies strong, meaning 1,000-1,200 infantry or 500-600 cavalry.³⁴

Contracts were less detailed and more varied at the start of this period, which soon started to cause problems. The original contracts did not guarantee compensation for the upkeep of recruits if muster was delayed, or provisions for the commission if the recruiter delivered more or less than the specified number of men. French recruiters complained of these omissions and referred to the standards of contracts in the Dutch army.³⁵ Some continental contractual norms were imported to Sweden, and later contracts were more detailed and standardised. Increasingly, the same phrases were repeated from document to document regardless of the recruiter's nationality. The commissions of Pierre de la Ville and Charles de la Vilette became normative, with subsequent contracts referring to the 'same terms' as given these two captains.³⁶

Contracts were not immutable. Most recruitments ran into some sort of difficulties, but both the recruiters and the Crown were willing to compromise to sort these out. For example, the number of recruits James Spens was meant to deliver was reduced three years after his first contract was signed, while William Stewart's target doubled from 1,000 to 2,000 men. Henri de la Borde had difficulty outfitting 500 cuirassiers but agreed to send the ones that were ready after receiving a promotion, alleviations on required equipment, and a second commission for 1.000 infantry.³⁷

32 LatRR, Contracts with Monsieur la Rivallier 14 January 1607, La Vilette 16 January 1607 and James Spens 7 October 1608.

33 The company was still the primary tactical unit in Sweden, but companies were starting to be combined into regiments for administrative purposes. Some of the larger commissions were clearly intended as regiments since they outline permissible regimental staff to recruit. LatRR, Contract with James Spens 7 October 1608.

34 Appendix 1.

35 StK, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 13 August 1607, Henri de la Borde to Karl IX 6 June 1608. Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, vol. 7, Överste De la Bordes villkor för värkning av sitt regemente 1608.

36 LatRR, Contracts with Baron de Tessier 17 July 1607, Casteguisson 21 April 1607, La Vilette 28 June 1608, Isaak du Vernet 3 July 1608, Levis de Ruart 3 July 1608, Jacques de Virie 3 July 1608, Jacobus Stuart Scoti 10 July 1608 and Saint Coullon 15 August 1609.

37 RR, Karl IX to Hans Nilsson 26 August 1607, Karl IX to Monsieur De la Borde 16 February 1608; StK, Henrik Horn to Karl IX 7 November 1607, De la Borde to Karl IX 2 December 1607; Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, vol. 7, Överste De la Bordes villkor för värkning av sitt regemente 1608; LatRR, Contracts with La Borde 3 September 1608, James Spens 7 October 1608 and Robert Stewart 24 February 1609, Karl IX to William Stewart 18 January 1610.

Sub-contracting recruitment

After receiving their commissions, officers had a limited time in which to find and enlist the men, provide them with necessary equipment and quarters, and arrange their transport and timely arrival at the muster place. To achieve this recruiters relied on their professional and familial networks. For the most part, recruiters were at liberty to appoint subordinate officers and personnel, many of whom would have been contracted before recruitment even started.³⁸ These captains, lieutenants and ensigns were each allocated a certain place to recruit a portion of the men, sometimes at their own expense.³⁹

In the wake of the long war against Spain, the United Provinces was an ideal place to recruit among discharged veterans, deserters and displaced men. Veterans, who were more experienced and resilient, were preferred.⁴⁰ However, the best of these were already in the pay of others, which caused competition between recruiters and tensions with the Dutch. Many recruiters already had some men under their command. A few claimed to command entire units, but this was rare. Unless they had recently been discharged or were already in the service of another, maintaining such a body for even a short time would have been costly and risky. Far more commonly recruiters retained a nucleus of their best and most trusted NCOs and veterans, which would form the cadre for the upcoming recruitment.⁴¹

Often recruits were enlisted within the officers' home territories either by them personally, or with the aid of local contacts. Many French recruiters travelled to their homes in Orange, Languedoc and elsewhere to recruit 'good men' among their friends, clients, tenants and other dependents.⁴² Nobiliary affinities formed the cornerstone of recruitment in England and Wales, while the clan structure of the Scottish Highlands proved effective in enticing or commanding men into service.⁴³ Some recruiters could use their office to draw recruits. For example, François des Essars boasted that as a

38 For example, the Baron de Tessier signed a contract to employ four captains to recruit his regiment on 1 March 1608. Three captains were approved by the King and the fourth was left blank for Tessier to fill later. LatRR, Contract with Tessier 1 March 1608 and appointments for Stephani de Metz 4 March 1608, Petri de Metz 4 March 1608, Francisci de Purrou 4 March 1608 and [name left blank] 10 March 1608.

39 StK, La Borde to Karl IX 6 June 1608; Redlich 1964, 271–280.

40 Roberts 1995, 14–16; Parker 1996, 50.

41 Pepyens said that he had a 'dozen or so' cavalry remaining. StK, Pepyens to Karl IX 13 August 1607.

42 Trim 2011, 158, 185–186; StK, Casteguisson to Karl IX 3 May 1608, De Corbeille to Karl IX 23 May 1608; *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 31 May 1606.

43 Trim 2002, Chapters 7–8; Murdoch and Grosjean 2014, 27–40.

captain in charge of coastal defence in Picardy, he would have no trouble finding recruits.⁴⁴

Recruitment of infantry in the British Isles also saw widespread use of impressment. In 1612 several Scottish recruiters were charged by the Scottish government for having 'violently pressed and taken a great many honest men's sons and carried them to their ships against their will'.⁴⁵ More significantly, with the blessing of James VI & I, but against the repeated prohibitions of Karl IX, William Stewart and others enlisted several thousand Irish Catholic rebels to swell their numbers. These men had been press-ganged into service to pacify the Ulster Plantation and rid the kingdom of troublemakers. Unsurprisingly, these men proved disloyal and those who did not desert en route quickly switched sides on the front.⁴⁶

Purchasing equipment

The provision of equipment was an important part of recruitment. Officers were expected to either recruit men who already possessed the necessary arms and armour, or to manage procurement. Surviving documentation gives an ambivalent picture of the norm. Karl IX clearly wanted recruiters to make purchases at their own expense and recover the cost from their commission and the subsequent wages of the men (a personal debt between the soldiers and their officers). Many officers in turn expected financial support either as advance payment of part of their commission, or with Swedish agents paying for the purchases directly.

Outfitting recruits from scratch was a considerable expense. Armour and guns, particularly those used by the cavalry, were expensive. In 1608, the crown's supplier lamented that a suit of cavalryman's armour could not be found at less than 16 riksdaler⁴⁷ (24 daler) and that a pair of wheel-lock pistols cost 8.5 riksdaler (12 daler 24 öre). Together with riding boots and swords (2 daler each), horse (20 daler) and tack (6 daler), the cost of outfitting an armoured cavalryman was in the region of 66 daler, or over twice the usual commission of 26 daler paid for each recruited trooper. For infantrymen, muskets and bandoliers were purchased from Germany in 1608 at 3.75 riksdaler (5 daler 20 öre) per set, while

44 Trim 2011, 158, 185–186; StK, Casteguison to Karl IX 3 May 1608, De Corbeille to Karl IX 23 May 1608, Francois des Essars to Karl IX 17 September 1608.

45 Fischer 1907, 77.

46 RR, Karl IX to William Stewart 6 May 1609 and 18 January 1610; Åberg 1990, 97; Grosjean 2003, 29–31; Miller 2007, 3, 10; Dunning and Hudson 2013.

47 The Swedish daler (abbreviated to daler in this article) was a unit of account worth 4 marks, which were not minted. Actual minted silver coins were called riksdaler, which were debased from 4,5 to 6 marks during the period. For the sake of simplicity, all monetary sums are given in daler. Edvinsson 2010, 148–149.

Karl IX calculated that a pikeman's armour should cost 6 daler to make, plus material expenses. Together with swords and pikes, a musketeer's equipment would come to just under the standard commission of 8 daler per recruit, while a pikeman's suit would cost more.⁴⁸

Availability too, was an issue. The large volume of Swedish recruitment, combined with increased fighting in the Netherlands and elsewhere, caused a spike in demand which made it difficult for recruiters to obtain necessary equipment in the timeframe demanded by Karl IX. If arms and armour were not ready, they had to be commissioned, which could take six months or more. Moreover, armour manufacturers generally required half-pay up-front and in cash, which was both difficult and risky for recruiters.⁴⁹

As a result, many officers had difficulties with procurements. Recruitments were delayed, and units arrived in Sweden without weapons, armour or clothing. Karl IX was forced to make concessions to provide some of the equipment. Already in 1605, the King agreed to provide horses for the cavalry, which were expensive and difficult to ship to Sweden. In 1608 these exemptions were expanded, with the Crown assuming an ever-larger role in equipping foreign recruits in conjunction with purchases to outfit domestic troops. Clothes, armour and firearms were imported in large quantities to Älvsborg from Amsterdam, Utrecht, Delft, Emden, Hamburg and Lübeck by trusted merchants.⁵⁰ Swedish armourers, gunsmiths and craftsmen were also commissioned to provide equipment with tools and raw materials furnished by the Crown, and in 1607 Finnish craftsmen received pay from the governor of Åbo for 169 days' work to make 2,400 pike shafts plus furniture for Scottish officers.⁵¹ The governor of Nyköping was ordered to oversee the manufacture and purchase of saddles and holsters, while civil servants in diverse locales were sent iron for local weaponsmiths to make arquebuses, muskets and swords.⁵²

48 De la Borde claimed that an infantryman's equipment cost 18 daler, which seems exaggerated. StK, Wilhelm von Danzig to Karl IX February 1608; RR, Karl IX to the governor of Älvsborg 26 June 1605; Riksarkivet, Strödda militiehandlingar före 1631, Del 1: Armén, Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, vol. 7, Simon Anderssons räkenskap 29 December 1608; Överste De la Bordes villkor för värvning av sitt regemente 1608.

49 StK, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 28 November 1607; Wilhelm von Danzig to Karl IX February 1608; La Borde to Karl IX 6 June 1608; Terjanian 2005.

50 RR, Karl IX to Cornelius Corneliusson 26 June 1605 and 22 December 1605, Karl IX to Niels Andersson 22 August 1606; StK, Abraham Cabiljau to Karl IX 18 February 1608.

51 RR, Contract with armourers Nidas and Påke Ilmettie 26 June 1605; Kansallisarkisto, Voudintilit, Varsinais-Suomen voutikunnan tilejä, vol. 1668, Turun linnan ja latokartanoiden tilikirja 1606–1607.

52 RR, Karl IX to Anders Pomeraning 4 May 1606 and 7 May 1606, Karl IX to Anthonius Svensson 25 June 1606, Karl IX to Jöns i Skogstorp 25 June 1606, Karl IX to Tideman Pederson 25 June 1606, Karl IX to Jören Jönsson 25 June 1606 and 26 July 1606, Karl IX to armourer Jören Sylvestersson 29 June 1606, Karl IX to the Governor of Nyköping 26 July 1606.

The most expensive item, horses, were imported from Northern Germany and elsewhere, but also requisitioned by local bailiffs from peasants in Sweden, Finland and Estonia against tax exemptions based on their perceived worth. There were also numerous complaints of both foreign and domestic units unlawfully confiscating horses.⁵³ In spite of these efforts, a shortage of horses and equipment continued to plague the units even after they were sent to the war zone.

The muster

The first muster formed the most crucial point of the entire operation, around which planning and coordination revolved. This was the point of delivery, where the recruiter was to present the agreed number of men and equipment to Swedish agents for inspection, before receiving his commission upon satisfactory completion of the contract. For their part, Swedish agents had to coordinate the complex financial operation so that necessary moneys were available at this crucial place and time.

A key difference between British and continental recruitments was where and how the muster was held. French and Dutch musters were at the port of embarkation, mainly Amsterdam, but also Emden, La Rochelle, Dieppe and Calais on occasion.⁵⁴ In contrast, English and Scottish units were not inspected before arrival in Sweden. It is not clear whether this was because of greater trust between the parties, because of established practice or because of practical reasons, such as it not being possible to send commissaries to inspect musters in the British Isles. However, this had important implications on the recruitment process and its after-effects.

French officers demanded full payment at muster, as was customary in continental Europe and outlined in their contracts. Once the units were overseas, the officers lost leverage in case of disputes, and had to rely on the Swedish Crown's goodwill to pay. For their part, Swedish commissaries were concerned that the French might desert and insisted that the units would board ships and sail to Sweden immediately after payment. Combined with other variables, such as ships not arriving on time or merchants delivering less funds than promised, this contributed to the failure and postponement

53 For example, RR, Karl IX to Cornelius Corneliusson 22 December 1605, Karl IX to Philip Scheding and Erich Jörenssohn 1 August 1606, Karl IX to Seved Ribbing and Bo Wernersson 12 September 1607; Riksarkivet, Riksarkivets ämnessamlingar, Krigshistoriska samlingen, VII Ryska Kriget 1609-1617, Strödda handlingar (M-1286), Evert Horn to Arvid Tönnesson 16 February 1610; Riksarkivet, Landskapshandlingar, Västergötlands handlingar, vol. 1607:1.

54 RR, Karl IX to Josiah de Tesseriers 13 September 1608.

of Regis de Vernet's and Henri De la Borde's musters in 1607 and 1608.⁵⁵

In comparison, operational management of the two largest British recruitments - by James Spens and William Stewart - was easier but riskier. Spens and Stewart received half or more of their commission in advance with the promise of payment of the rest in Sweden. There was thus no need to oversee the muster or arrange funds at exactly the right place and time. However, the Swedes also lacked control over how recruitment progressed and could not be certain of the outcome before arrival, a risk which was realised for both recruiters. Although Spens eventually delivered the men, most arrived five years or more after first payment. Stewart was faster, but besides Scottish and English troops, delivered some 1,000 unwanted Irish as well.⁵⁶

Shipping and arrival in Sweden

The final phase of the process was the shipping of units to Sweden and their reception there. Shipping from the United Provinces and France was the responsibility of the Swedish Crown, which used either its own merchant navy or hired ships. There were also attempts to use the same ships exporting wares to bring back soldiers, but the coordination of these efforts proved difficult. At the outset Karl IX wanted to manage the shipping of Scottish soldiers as well, but by 1607 this notion seems to have been dropped. Instead, recruiters in the British Isles ended up arranging their own transport, for which they received recompense afterwards.⁵⁷ The port of Älvsborg-Nylöse formed a crucial bottleneck for the arrival of recruits from Western Europe. With Denmark in control of Norway, Scania and maritime travel across the Sound, this was the only port where soldiers and military supplies traveling across the North Sea could be sent safely.⁵⁸ Nylöse was also the home port of many of the Swedish ships and merchants involved with the logistical enterprise. Furthermore, the fortress of Älvsborg and city

55 Tallet 1992, 97; Parker 1996, 55-56; StK, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 4 June 1607 and 13 August 1607, Henrik Horn to Karl IX 7 November 1607; RR, Karl IX to Hans Nilsson 9 June 1607, Karl IX to Henrik Horn, Anders Haraldsson and Henrik Eriksson 5 September 1607, Karl IX to Monsieur De la Borde 16 February 1608; Karl IX to Monsieur Regis (de Vernet) 16 February 1608; Karl IX to Hans Nilsson and Augustino Cassiodoro 28 February 1608.

56 LatRR, Karl IX to James Spens 29 May 1607, 7 October 1608, 20 November 1608 and 3 January 1609, Karl IX to William Stewart 7 April 1608 and 26 February 1609.

57 For example, RR, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 9 April 1606, 14 April 1606, 21 January 1607, 12 June 1607, 5 September 1607 and 15 September 1607, Karl IX to James Spens 16 January 1607, Karl IX to Hans Pedersson 30 March 1607, Karl IX to De la Borde 3 September 1608.

58 Some units arrived by other routes and through hostile Danish territory, resulting in considerable hardships and some fatalities. Nixon 1610; RR, Karl IX to Hans Nilsson 4 November 1608, Karl IX's patent to Bengt Rutz 28 February 1608, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 28 February 1608.

of Nylöse provided a suitable administrative and supply centre to receive the men and a strong garrison to police them should they cause trouble.⁵⁹

After arrival, troops were sent inland as quickly as possible, usually without waiting for the rest of their formation to arrive.⁶⁰ The King, who wished to maintain personal control, was informed of arrivals and provided instructions where they were to be sent. Some units received funds, such as 267 freshly arrived 'Nederlandske' soldiers, who were issued with half a month's pay of 1,068 daler and a promise to get the rest in Stockholm.⁶¹ Most got significantly less to cover expenses until their arrival at more permanent quarters. For the trip inland, the troops were assigned trusted men from Älvsborg's Swedish garrison to act as guides and supervise them on the march.⁶²

Until the units could be properly mustered and shipped to war, they were quartered in small groups of some thirty to one-hundred men either in central Sweden (in or near Mariestad, Jönköping, Örebro, Arboga and Linköping), or closer to Stockholm (Norrköping, Nyköping, Västerås and Stockholm, though for reasons of security not within the actual city). The troops were to be provisioned from the market, with local burghers ordered to make their wares available. To buy supplies, soldiers were issued with subsistence wages (*löhnung*), which one ordnance gave as 0.5 daler for each man per week, while a cavalry unit received 1 daler per man. These funds were to be arranged by the burghers of towns and by parish priests, although at times local peasantry and bailiffs were ordered to assist as well.⁶³

In practice, supply of the troops did not go as smoothly as expected, leading to conflicts with the civilian population. During the march from Älvsborg some units proved unruly, requisitioning horses and causing trouble, which prompted Swedish authorities to withhold arms and mounts from subsequent detachments until they were ready to ship to war.⁶⁴ Pay was also a source of contention. Burghers protested against the heavy burden, while soldiers complained of insufficient funds to cover even basic

59 RR, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling 21 January 1607, Karl IX to Bo Ribbing 23 December 1607.

60 RR, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling 22 June 1606 and 15 July 1606, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling, Johan Jörensso and Erich Jörensso 1 August 1606.

61 RR, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling, Johan Jörensso and Erich Jörensso 15 July 1606 and 1 August 1606.

62 Riksarkivet, Landskapshandlingar, Västergötlands handlingar, vol. 1607:1, Receipts for Anders Andersson 22 June 1607 and 22 June 1608, Sefuerd Stewart 2 November 1607, Daniel von Bowenten 14 December 1607, Thomas Kinnard 14 December 1607, Anders Larsson 12 May 1608 and Jacob Barrie (no date).

63 RR, Karl IX's instructions to Jören Claesson 17 November 1607, Karl IX to Seved Ribbing 15 December 1607, Karl IX to Bengt Rutz 28 February 1608.

64 RR, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling, Johan Jörensso and Erich Jörensso 1 August 1606.

necessities and other hardships, as described by Anthony Nixon in his memoir.⁶⁵

Due to costs and the pressing military situation, the King sought to ship the soldiers east as swiftly as possible, often pushing for unrealistic timetables. Troops were sent out with larger fleets for added protection and to ensure reinforcements arrived at the war zone in sufficiently large numbers to be effective. Prior to shipping, the men congregated at ports, such as Djurhamn near Stockholm and Varvsholmen at Kalmar, were mustered (often with the King himself in attendance) and issued with pay and equipment. Finally, with the troops boarded and more-or-less equipped, the units were sent to war.⁶⁶

Funding and financial logistics

The actual process of finding and recruiting soldiers and transporting them to Sweden was only part of the operation. Equally important and far more difficult was the parallel process of financing recruitment and arranging for funds to be where they were needed on time. This was complicated by a chronic lack of coinage, Sweden's undeveloped fiscal economy and its remote, overseas position with regards to recruitment.⁶⁷

The Crown relied on profits from the sale of the country's raw materials to finance its recruitment operations and needed to ensure that these profits, in cash, could be delivered to recruiters when and where it was required. The cash, men, equipment and transports, all had to arrive in the right place at the right time. Coordination of the process was difficult, and lack of trust between the parties and need for security added additional complications. Finally, poor planning and financial overcommitment added hurdles to an already complex operation.

Officers as creditors

The early phase of Swedish recruitment was heavily dependent on credit advanced by recruiters. Before the first muster, the officers and their men were not yet in Swedish pay, and recruiters were expected to cover the cost of getting their units ready. This involved paying the men a small sum of enlistment money, outfitting them, as well as feeding and quartering them. To keep costs down and avoid friction with local administration, recruits were kept dispersed as long

65 RR, Karl IX to the burghers of [blank] city 11 March 1608, Karl IX to Hans Nilsson 4 November 1608, Karl IX to Sefved Ribbing, Hans Åkesson and Nils Andersson 15 December 1608, Karl IX Sefved Ribbing 17 December 1608; Nixon 1610.

66 Lewenhaupt 1903, *Calendaria Caroli IX* 29 August 1606, 3 September 1606, 31 May 1607, 31 July 1607 and 5 August 1607; Nixon 1610.

67 Roberts 1958, 45-48.

as possible - initially on their farmsteads and later in small groups closer to the muster place. It was assumed that the commission would cover these costs, and hopefully yield a profit on these non-interest-generating loans provided by the officers.⁶⁸

Many officers were in turn dependent on the credit and funds of their own network. Part of the responsibility was delegated to subordinate officers, who would cover a cost proportional to their position within the unit. Recruiters also relied on their family and friends for funds and credit. Thus, although the captain or colonel held overall responsibility and acted as the point of contact with Swedish agents, financing the operation was in fact a shared burden. This was a mutually beneficial solution as it gave the Crown access to a larger credit network and reduced the risk and burden for the recruiter.⁶⁹

In some recruitments the Crown might pay something in advance. For example, in 1606 Karl IX ordered 100-200 daler '*lopgelt*' paid to Captain de Serrant and 100 daler to Captain Reigner, whereas in 1607 Commissary Henrik Horn demanded *anritt* for the French cavalry.⁷⁰ *Laufgeld* and *anritt* were standardised payments on the international market for infantry and cavalry, respectively, issued to recruits on enlistment to cover living expenses for the journey to the muster place.⁷¹ More significantly, large Scottish recruiters James Spens and William Stewart each received considerable advances of 8,105 riksdaler (ca.12,160 daler) and 6,000 daler, respectively.⁷²

In spite of these examples, it would seem that advance payments were the exception rather than the norm. The examples given above suggest that advances were provided when it was felt they would expedite recruitment and when the recruiters could be trusted. Trust, of course, depended on many factors. The sums given to de Serrant and Reigner were small, whereas Spens's and Stewart's high rank added credibility and reduced the risk of them disappearing with the money. Furthermore, William Stewart's finances were guaranteed by his kinsmen the Earl of Orkney, the Duke of Lennox and Robert

68 Redlich 1964, 270-275; Björklund 2021; StK, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 4 June 1607, 13 August 1607 and 28 November 1607, Henrik Horn to Karl IX 7 November 1607, Casteguison to Karl IX 1 December 1607 and 3 May 1608; *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 28 July 1607.

69 Björklund 2021.

70 RR, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 9 April 1606, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson 26 April 1606; StK, Henrik Horn to Karl IX [date missing] 1607 and 7 November 1607.

71 Redlich 1964, 41-42.

72 RR, Karl IX to Anders Haraldsson 14 April 1606; LatRR, Karl IX to James Spens 29 May 1607, Karl IX to William Stewart 7 April 1608.

Stewart, without whose intervention the recruitment might have floundered.⁷³

Advance payments and fiscal support were also open to negotiation once recruitment was underway. Only one of the surviving contracts made with French recruiters mentions advance payments but, nonetheless, French officers clearly expected assistance for the purchase of equipment and, when recruitment took longer than anticipated, upkeep for the men waiting to be shipped.⁷⁴ For example, in 1608 Colonel La Borde complained that he had been unable to make purchases due to receiving only 500 florins (250 daler) per company from the Swedes which, when divided between the captain, lieutenant and *cornet* (ensign), provided only 200 franks (84 daler) per subordinate recruiter. La Borde himself had spent more than 15,000 florins (7,500 daler) of his own, which he considered unreasonable since he had inherited only a 'good name and prowess at arms, but little wealth'.⁷⁵ In the event, the Swedes agreed to compromise. From 1608 onward the purchase of equipment was increasingly managed by Swedish commissaries and trusted merchants, greatly easing the financial strain of the recruiters.⁷⁶

Sources of finance

Irrespective of whether the cost of recruitment was paid upfront or once the units were ready for shipping, it needed to be paid sooner or later. This cost was immense, with the combined commission of all the troops contracted from Western Europe 1606–1610 being over 250,000 daler (see Appendix 1). If only completed recruitments are considered, the sum is still over 150,000 daler, which excludes transportation to Sweden, over 4,000 mounts (around 20 daler per horse), arms and armour purchased separately and baggage horses. Furthermore, most recruitments took over a year to complete, which incurred additional upkeep expenses. Finally, it is worth mentioning the operational cost of this recruitment, including transport and transaction costs for selling wares, wages for Swedish commissaries, diplomats and civil servants, and other incidental expenses.

Sweden, like many early modern states, lacked cash. The economy was undeveloped and there was remarkably little coinage in circulation. Most taxes

73 LatRR, Karl IX to the Earl of Orkney and Lord of Shetland 9 January 1608, Karl IX to Robert Stewart 24 February 1609, Karl IX to William Stewart 6 September 1609; Riksarkivet, Kammarkollegiet Ämnessamlingar, Kammarkollegiet skuldböcker, vol.1, Account of the Crown's debts to Robert Stewart.

74 LatRR, Contract with Pierre de Tranconis April 1607; StK, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 13 August 1607, Henrik Horn to Karl IX 7 November 1607.

75 StK, La Borde to Karl IX 6 June 1608.

76 LatRR, Karl IX to Josiah Baron de Tessier 27 June 1608; StK, Wilhelm von Danzig to Karl IX February 1608.

were collected in kind, and commerce relied heavily on barter and credit. The Crown was reluctant to let any cash it did obtain slip abroad, and it was, in any case, needed to service the domestic economy and pay troops already fighting for Sweden. Furthermore, most Swedish coinage was not accepted elsewhere, which meant that transferring domestic funds to the international economic sphere required either re-minting or exchange, with their own limitations and complications.⁷⁷

Because of these constraints, cash collected from tolls and taxes by the central treasury in Stockholm and provincial treasury of Älvsborg was mainly used to cover small operational costs, such as travel funds for officers and royal agents. Small sums were also advanced to recruiters to get their operations started more quickly, while larger amounts were occasionally used to cover unexpected shortfalls in other means of financing and where expediency was required.⁷⁸

Cash could also be loaned from foreign or domestic merchants and bankers, usually as advance payments for anticipated revenues and wares that the King promised to deliver in the near future.⁷⁹ As the Crown's credit was bad, merchants were reluctant to advance funds without strong securities, and even trusted merchants might refuse to provide money before repayment was all but certain. Foreign creditors were even more stringent, charging high interest with short repayment cycles. Nonetheless, when the need was dire, such expensive loans were necessary, as in 1607, when commissary Hans Nilsson was forced to borrow 8,000 gyllen (ca.4,000 daler) at an exorbitant rate in Amsterdam to pay disgruntled recruiters.⁸⁰

The main source for funding was from the sale of raw materials and semi-finished products received as taxes and from royal domains or purchased within Sweden using the Crown's Royal prerogative. The King favoured high-value, easy to transport wares that were in demand abroad. Most important was copper in its various forms (plate copper, blister copper and brass), over which the Swedish kings had established an export monopoly in the sixteenth century. Copper exports accounted for around half and perhaps as much as

77 Roberts 1958, 45-48; Björklund 2021; RR, Karl IX to Seved Ribbing 17 November 1607.

78 For example RR, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson 26 April 1606, Karl IX to Evert Horn 27 April 1606; Riksarkivet, Landskapshandlingar, Västergötlands handlingar, vols. 1606:16 and 1607:1, Expenditure accounts for Älvsborg castle.

79 Such as a request to borrow 8,000-10,000 daler from the merchants of Gothenburg against promised payment in copper and iron the following year. RR, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 28 December 1607.

80 Björklund 2021. *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 4 November 1607.

60% of the funds used to recruit troops in Western Europe.⁸¹ Also important was wrought iron, iron ores, steel and products such as nails, anchors and pots. Other resources included forest products (planks, mast trees and tar), as well as agricultural produce consisting mainly of rye and butter. Vitriol and lead, by-products of the copper industry, were also exported in some quantity.⁸²

Älvsborg castle, with the adjoining cities of Nylöse and Gothenburg, served as the administrative, logistical and commercial hub for exports for the same reasons it was used to import troops: proximity to North Sea recruiting areas and circumvention of the Danish controlled Sound straight. In addition, the mainly Dutch merchants of Gothenburg had the best connections to Amsterdam, which rapidly became the continental centre of the financial operation.⁸³ Grain collected as taxes from the surrounding provinces (*läns*) and cities, and some other wares, naturally flowed into Älvsborg, but other goods required significant administrative and logistical efforts. Copper came from Stora Kopparberget, 500 kilometres north-east of Älvsborg, where the mines produced an estimated 2,000-4,500 skeppund (1 skeppund = 170 kg) of copper annually, which the Crown purchased from the miners' guild with grain collected as taxes. In 1606 the agreed rate was 18 barrels of grain per skeppund, and the delivery of these thousands of barrels was in itself a major operation for local and central administration.⁸⁴

Transportation of copper to Älvsborg was harder than to Stockholm, yet nonetheless some 500 skeppund (85 tonnes) was diverted that way in both 1606 and 1607.⁸⁵ Waterways were used when possible, but several legs of the journey still required tedious overland transport. Logistics for large shipments were managed by royal agents dispatched by the king. Local bailiffs were ordered to hire barges and arrange peasants with carts for the various legs of the journey. In 1606 the compensation given to peasants was one öre (1/32 daler) per Swedish mil (10 km). Cash to pay for this would be taken from local

81 This figure is estimated based on 744 skeppund delivered to Abraham Cabiljau, 456 skeppund to Wilhelm von Danzig, 300 skeppund to Hans Öfverberger, 201 skeppund to the Holland Admiralty. 225 skeppund was also assigned to Robert Stewart, of which at least 74 skeppund were delivered. Riksarkivet, Lokala tullräkenskaper, vol. 514:3, Älvsborg och Nya Lödöse 1607, vol. 515:1, Älvsborg och Nya Lödöse 1608, vol. 515:2, Älvsborg och Nya Lödöse 1608; Kammarkollegiet skuldböcker, vol. 1, Account of the Crown's debt with Robert Stewart, vol. 5, fol.665-672, Abraham Cabeliaus räkning för Anno 1607, 1608, 1609 och 1610; RR, Allocation of 106 skeppund copper to Abraham Cabiljau 27 August 1607, Allocation of 106 skeppund copper to Abraham Cabiljau 27 August 1607, Karl IX to Sefved Ribbing 17 November 1607; StK, Abraham Cabiljau to Karl IX 18 February 1608; Riksarkivet, Landskapshandlingar, Västergötlands handlingar, vol.1606:16, fol.40-42.

82 Tikka 2020, 36-39.

83 Wirta, Tikka and Björklund 2021 [forthcoming].

84 Heckscher 1935, 168-169; RR, Karl IX to Lasse Christiansson 21 December 1606.

85 Riksarkivet, Landskapshandlingar, Västergötlands handlingar, vols.1606:16 and 1607:1.

sources of revenue, such as the tolls of Västerås and Arboga or taxes collected at Örebro. Presumably, peasants would get tax exemptions rather than cash, which was reserved for merchants renting out their barges.⁸⁶

The Crown depended heavily on merchant networks to sell the wares and arrange financial transactions. Wares could be sold to merchants in Nylöse or Gothenburg, exported by royal agents and sold abroad, or exported by merchants on behalf of the Crown. It seems that Karl IX preferred to use a few trusted and well-connected enterprisers and individual large contracts which could fund an entire recruitment. This was understandable, as it facilitated management of the financial operation and avoided the piecemeal delivery of money, but this did increase reliance on individual contacts and contracts succeeding.

Getting funds to where they were needed was another problem. Payments for exports might be realised only at the receiving port after the wares had been delivered and sold. In this case, the King tried to arrange for the sale of goods and the muster of troops to occur in the same place at the same time, with Swedish commissaries present to oversee financial transactions and with as little movement of cash as possible.⁸⁷ To avoid complications, the Swedes used bills of exchange (*vexel brev*) extensively. The buyer (or a third party) would write a bill, guaranteeing payment of a certain sum, which Swedish agents could redeem from the buyer's representative or a banking house at a specific city within a certain timeframe. Bills of exchange avoided the risk and trouble of transporting cash but were restrictive in the sense that they were dependent on mercantile networks, and relied heavily on Amsterdam, Hamburg and other financial centres.⁸⁸

Developing mercantile networks

As with recruitment, the initial financial operation in 1606 was unorganised and scattered. Cash was used to jumpstart the operation; the most promising recruiter, James Spens, was to receive 4,000 riksdaler (4,500 daler) and 2,000 daler worth of other coinage, while at least 1,600 daler was assigned by Karl IX to commissaries Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to initiate recruitment

86 In 1606, copper deposited at Västerås was transported via lake Mälaren to Arboga, overland to Sjöledes, by waterways to Örebro, overland to Mariestad, across lake Vänern to Brätte, overland via Bugeström to Kungälv and then on the Göta river to Älvsborg. RR, Karl IX to Ivar Sverkersson 13 July 1606, Karl IX to Nils Jörensso 8 October 1606 and 18 November 1606.

87 For example RR, Karl IX to French captains 19 April 1607, Karl IX to Söffring Jönsson 5 September 1607 and 5 December 1607; StK. Henrik Horn to Karl IX [no date] 1607.

88 Tikka 2020, 39; RR, Karl IX to Söffring Jönsson 28 December 1607.

in Amsterdam.⁸⁹ At the same time the royal merchant vessel *Lybeske Duovan* was sent to Amsterdam carrying lumber products for the ship's captain and commissaries to sell.⁹⁰

As might be expected, Karl IX turned to existing commercial structures to make these operations work. The merchants of Nylöse were asked to transfer these funds with bills of exchange, and Governor Söffring Jönsson was told to find somebody to export wares to Scotland and bring back Spens's anticipated recruits.⁹¹ Burgher Henrik Franklin, who seems to have enjoyed considerable trust, was to export 100 skeppund of copper, iron and other wares to France and Amsterdam.⁹² However, these ventures with Franklin apparently fell through, either because Karl IX changed his mind or because the resources were not available.⁹³ These were indeed common problems throughout the recruitment; export operations repeatedly failed because the same wares had been assigned to multiple recipients, fewer resources were delivered than promised, or because resources failed to arrive on time.⁹⁴

The most important financial venture of 1606 and 1607 was the sale of copper to the Admiralty of the Province of Holland. This was apparently a Dutch initiative mediated by another Dutch merchant, Cornelius Corneliusson, who had become a naturalised burgher of Nylöse and one of the King's trusted men. The Dutch Admiralty offered to purchase large volumes of copper, delivered at Nylöse and shipped with the Admiralty's own vessels, with payment in Holland. Karl IX was understandably enthusiastic about pursuing this contract and seems to have hoped to sell around 500 skeppund to the Dutch in 1606, worth over 20,000 daler. Concluding this deal and making necessary arrangements was one of the first priorities for the commissaries upon arrival in Amsterdam in May 1606.⁹⁵

This first large contract proved challenging. Negotiations with the Dutch over terms took time and the parties had to agree first on some very basic

89 By 1609 Spens had already received 9,000 daler in advances. LatRR, Security to merchants who shall advance funds to James Spens 3 January 1609; RR, Karl IX to Anders Haraldsson 14 April 1606, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson 26 April 1606. *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 31 May 1606.

90 *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 31 May 1606.

91 RR, Karl IX to Söffring Jönsson 14 April 1606, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson 26 April 1606.

92 RR, Karl IX to Reinhold Ryk 2 March 1606, Karl IX to Söffring Jönsson 15 June 1606 and 22 June 1606, Karl IX to Henrik Franklin 2 May 1606, 2 June 1606 and 22 June 1606.

93 RR, Karl IX to Henrik Franklin 18 June 1606 and 22 June 1606, Karl IX to Söffring Jönsson 22 June 1606.

94 RR, Karl IX to Reinhold Ryk 14 April 1606 and 14 May 1606.

95 *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 11 May 1606; RR, Karl IX to Cornelius Corneliusson 4 July 1606.

elements, such as what weights and measures to use, and how the quality of the copper could be ensured. The Admiralty was also very conscious of its power, using their favourable position to push down the price. Karl IX had given strict instructions not to sell for less than 40 riksdaler (45 daler) per skeppund, which he considered a fair price in Stockholm and far below the copper's value in Nylöse.⁹⁶ Although the price in Amsterdam was much higher, the Admiralty maintained that, since they arranged transportation and were willing to pay part in advance, 81 gylден (40.5 daler) was sufficient. In desperate need of cash and pressed for time due to the tight timeframe, the commissaries agreed, and asked the King to transfer the copper.⁹⁷

At this point, Swedish operational management failed. Karl had come to realise the logistical difficulties of delivering copper to Älvsborg during the spring thaw, and sent instructions in March to arrange delivery to Stockholm instead.⁹⁸ This letter took approximately two months to reach the commissaries, by which time the deal had already been concluded. The King in turn did not learn of the contract until mid-June, by which time much of the copper stockpiled at Västerås had been diverted to service other debts.⁹⁹ The Dutch, who had already advanced several thousand daler, were not happy to learn of the delay, and rejected any notion of fetching the copper from Stockholm. The commissaries did their best to assure the Admiralty that their wares would soon be in Älvsborg and managed to secure another advance payment to keep the recruitment going, but on condition that no further troops would be taken out of the country before the contract had been fulfilled.¹⁰⁰

In spite of the delays, the Admiralty was eventually delivered 200-300 skeppund of copper, along with 128 skeppund of wrought iron and perhaps also 3,000 barrels of rye.¹⁰¹ Though the operation had not gone as planned, these funds sufficed to recruit at least 400 men in 1606. Collaboration with the Dutch continued, and during the autumn there were renewed talks for delivery of 500 skeppund of copper, lead, vitriol sulphate, and cannon balls to the Admiralty.¹⁰²

96 RR, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson 3 March 1606.

97 *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 11 May 1606 and 31 May 1606.

98 RR, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson 25 March 1606.

99 RR, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 22 June 1606.

100 *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 31 May 1606 and 5 June 1606.

101 RR, Karl IX to Matias Furere 16 April 1606 and 27 April 1606, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 22 June 1606 and 4 July 1606, Karl IX to Cornelius Corneliusson 2 October 1606; *Riksarkivet, Landskapshandlingar, Västergötlands handlingar*, vol. 1606:16, fol.40-42.

102 RR, Karl IX to Cornelius Corneliusson 4 July 1606 and 15 August 1606, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 15 August 1606.

In 1607, the focus of recruitment shifted to areas bordering the United Provinces. Dutch restrictions on the export of troops meant that muster was to take place at Dieppe or Calais.¹⁰³ In April the recruiters proposed to embark from Emden in East Frisia instead.¹⁰⁴ Financing again depended on the export of wares directly by the Crown aboard ships of the Swedish navy, together with a large delivery of copper to the Admiralty of Holland. The original plan of repayment in Amsterdam was adapted, and the Admiralty was asked to provide payment to the commissaries through the intermediary of Karl IX's nephew, Count Enno III of East Frisia.¹⁰⁵

The Swedes had failed to account for political realities, however. Count Enno III and the city of Emden were practically in a state of war, and the Dutch in fact guaranteed the independence of the city against their count, who in turn had sought Spanish backing.¹⁰⁶ Against this backdrop, the Admiralty refused to transfer funds to Emden, while payment in Amsterdam was impossible if the recruits could not be shipped out from the city. The complex arrangement did not collapse overnight, and it took almost a month before the Swedish monarch realised that the deal had fallen through. By this time, it was mid-May, while the original schedule called for the muster to be held around the start of June. A new plan was quickly thrown together to export 300 skeppund via merchant Hans Överberger on behalf of the Crown, while the commissaries scrambled together what wares they could from Älvsborg to sell in Emden themselves.¹⁰⁷

The botched trade deal was not the only problem though. While the commissaries were busy arranging funding, they failed to communicate the schedule to the recruiters. Calling troops together was expensive and risky so recruiters were reluctant to get their units ready without knowledge of when and where the muster would be held. As a result of this uncertainty, the units never showed up. The commissaries arrived at Emden in June and remained there with ships for a month or so. During this time some of the wares were sold, and the commissaries managed to arrange a bill of exchange worth 20,000 daler against the copper and some other wares, payable at Emden.

103 RR, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 5 December 1606, 11 December 1606 and 21 January 1607, Karl IX to Hans Pederson 30 March 1607.

104 RR, Karl IX to French captains 19 April 1607.

105 RR, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 19 April 1607 and 21 April 1607.

106 Ten Raa & De Baas 1913, 323-327.

107 Riksarkivet, Landskapshandlingar, Västergötlands handlingar, vol. 1606:16, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 11 May 1607, Christoffer von Norden's receipt for 300 skeppund of copper received on behalf of Hans Överberger 29 May 1607, Receipt of wares sent to Emden 29 May 1607, Receipt of provisions for ambassadors Hans Nilsson and Evert Horn 29 May 1607.

After some time, Commissary Hans Nilsson decided to abort the mission, the ships returned to Älvsborg and the bill of exchange was sent to the King in Stockholm.¹⁰⁸

A round of mutual recrimination ensued but, in the end, there was nothing for it but to try again. The King ordered money and ships to pick up as many men as possible from Dieppe or Calais, with the remainder to be picked up when more money was available. This was easier said than done, as the assigned ships from Älvsborg had already been given other missions and payment via bills of exchange would once again have to be rearranged through Sweden's merchant network. The enterprisers were also reluctant to send part of their men ahead of the rest.¹⁰⁹

After the failed venture the financial operation shifted into the hands of a new mercantile group, consisting of mainly Dutch merchants organised as the Gothenburg Trade Company. The establishment of the company, which received its founding privileges on 8 September 1607, was part of Karl IX's longer-term goal of boosting foreign trade and increasing Swedish commercial independence. To bring in the necessary capital, know-how and commercial connections, the monarch had enticed Dutch merchants to immigrate to the newly established city of Gothenburg. Although this venture was essentially separate from the recruitment operation, the export of wares to finance recruitment, the growth of the company and the development of Gothenburg and its surrounding logistical infrastructure fed off each other and were interconnected.¹¹⁰

The merchants of the Gothenburg Trade Company quickly gained a preferred status in receiving wares for export, much to the chagrin of the old network of Nylöse merchants. Although they were not initially very wealthy, the Gothenburg merchants were well-connected to mercantile groups in Amsterdam and had friends and family in their old home city. Using this network, the merchants proved capable of selling Swedish wares and transferring funds promptly with bills of exchange. Perhaps more importantly, they were willing to operate on credit, transferring funds and purchasing equipment against promised deliveries of wares in the future.

Already in August 1607, two of the foremost merchants became involved. Abraham Cabiljau and Wilhelm von Danzig agreed to provide 14,400 daler

108 *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 28 July 1607; StK, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 4 June 1607 and 13 August 1607.

109 RR, Karl IX to Hans Nilsson 9 June 1607; *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 28 July 1607.

110 Tikka 2020, 40-43.

in Amsterdam, followed soon after with 13,200 daler in Hamburg.¹¹¹ These sums were sufficient to bring some of the stranded French over, but the onset of winter and stringent Dutch prohibitions on exports made this difficult. Cabiljau bribed port officials in Amsterdam to allow the shipping of some, while additional detachments sailed from Dieppe and Emden. However, the bulk had to wait for more favourable conditions in 1608.¹¹²

In 1608, the Gothenburg Trade Company took on an even larger role, agreeing to deliver 30,400 riksdaler (45,600 daler) in Amsterdam against a promised delivery of 500 skeppund of copper, 10,000 barrels of rye and other wares.¹¹³ To facilitate recruitment, the contract with many recruiters was re-negotiated, with the Crown agreeing to take over procurement of arms and armour on behalf of the recruiters (the cost would be subtracted from subsequent wages).¹¹⁴ A large portion of this procurement was delegated to the merchants of the company and in June the King told Baron de Tessier that the purchase and import of 'all sorts of arms and armour' for the army had been entrusted to Wilhelm von Danzig.¹¹⁵

During the last few years of the recruitment, the credit and financial services provided by merchants of the Gothenburg Trade Company seem to have been sufficient to bring to a happy conclusion most of those recruitments undertaken in 1607 and 1608. Abraham Cabiljau's accounts with the Crown have survived, which reveal that in 1607-1610 this merchant alone provided 113,920 daler in cash for recruitment and the Crown's other needs, in return for which he received 98,284 daler worth of cash and wares. The importance of credit advanced by Cabiljau was enormous, and by February 1610 the crown owed him 37,810 daler. This outstanding debt was cleared with the delivery of over 348 skeppund of copper and brass, and 17,902 daler worth of sable furs taken from Russia by the victorious Swedish army.¹¹⁶

111 RR, Karl IX to Hans Nilsson 26 August 1607, Karl IX to Henrik Horn, Anders Haraldson and Henrik Eriksson 5 September 1607, Karl IX to Seved Ribbing 17 November 1607; *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 23 September 1607 and 14 October 1607; StK, Abraham Cabiljau to Karl IX 31 December 1607.

112 StK, Abraham Cabiljau to Karl IX 18 February 1608, Jacques de Roques to Karl IX 18 February 1608; RR, Karl IX to commissaries Hans Nilsson and Augustino Cassiodoro 28 February 1608; *Kammarkollegiet skuldböcker*, vol. 5, fol.665-672, Abraham Cabeliaus räkning för Anno 1607, 1608, 1609 och 1610.

113 StK, Abraham Cabiljau to Karl IX 18 February 1608, Paridon von Horn to Karl IX 28 September 1608.

114 RR, Karl IX to French cavalry 9 June 1608, Karl IX to La Borde 3 September 1608; StK, Wilhelm von Danzig to Karl IX February 1608, Abraham Cabiljau to Karl IX 18 February 1608, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 26 April 1608.

115 LatRR, Karl IX to Josiah de Tessier 27 June 1608.

116 *Kammarkollegiet skuldböcker*, vol. 5, fol.665-672, Abraham Cabeliaus räkning för Anno 1607, 1608, 1609 och 1610.

Diplomatic process

Recruiting the subjects of foreign monarchs and using their territory for recruiting operations naturally affected foreign relations, an additional aspect that had to be considered. Sovereigns and local magnates were keen to control the movements and loyalties of their subjects and clients, particularly when a foreign power was involved. Authorities also wanted to ensure that levies would not cause disorder, hinder their own military needs or recruit the wrong individuals, such as tenants. Foreign potentates had to also consider the political threat of arming and mobilising dangerous individuals and groups. Finally, monarchs were very conscious of the diplomatic implications of providing military resources to one power to fight others. Even if this was acceptable, such support would seldom be given for free.

It was certainly possible to attempt recruitment without foreign blessing. However, in the United Provinces, France and the British Isles, central administration was strong, meaning that not going through the proper channels ran the risk of the administration hindering or even preventing recruitment. Moreover, Karl IX desperately needed foreign support for his war and political recognition to legitimise his kingship, usurped from Sigismund. Both practical and political reasons thus made fostering diplomatic relations with these powers important.

First attempts

In the years leading up to 1605, Sweden had maintained only irregular diplomatic relations with Western European states. There was no ambassadorial presence abroad, and formal dealings with other countries and their rulers were on an irregular, ad hoc basis. Recruitment had largely depended on informal networks, which had sufficed to provide levies. However, the volume of recruitment after Kirkholm was so great that it could not be ignored in foreign relations. Extending recruitment to new territories also required political groundwork to ensure recruits' loyalty, and to gain support of local authorities.

Karl IX wasted no time in making diplomatic overtures to the British, French and Dutch leadership. In October 1605 the king sent a personal letter to James VI & I, reminding his counterpart of the good relations Sweden and England had shared during the reign of Elizabeth I and of their common Protestant cause. Ultra-Catholic Sigismund was represented as a threat against all Protestants, and Karl IX requested permission to employ King James's subjects to counter this threat.¹¹⁷ To strengthen the message, a second letter was sent to Sir Robert

117 RR, Karl IX to the King of England and Scotland 24 October 1605.

Cecil, asking the Secretary of State for England to 'continue' lending support by convincing his king to allow Swedish recruitment. James Spens and Richard Barker were also told to proceed with recruitment, provided they could gain permission from their monarch.¹¹⁸

Around the same time, another letter was drafted for Henri IV of France.¹¹⁹ During the sixteenth century, Franco-Swedish relations had been generally good, but spasmodic. The foundation for these relations was a treaty signed in 1542 and renewed in 1559 and 1592, in which the monarchs promised mutual military assistance and trade rights.¹²⁰ For France, Sweden offered a useful outer rim ally in its anti-Habsburg foreign policies, and a partner for Baltic commerce. Sweden had also profited from trade with France, political support of the 'Most Christian King' and recruitment of French troops in the past.¹²¹

The British and French monarchs remained unconvinced, however. As a usurper, Karl IX remained a pariah. Recognition of the Swedish king was particularly difficult for the legalistically minded King James who continued to support Sigismund, at least in public. The Stuart monarch was also in a dynastic alliance with his brother-in-law Kristian IV of Denmark-Norway, another Swedish rival. Although this alliance had its frictions, James remained committed, and was unconvinced by Swedish assurances that his subjects would not be used against Kristian.¹²²

Henri IV was not as vehemently opposed, but did not want to be the first monarch to recognise Karl IX either. Assistance to Sweden was opposed by Catholic groups and Polish delegates at the French court, and some of the King's senior advisors counselled against jeopardising the Dutch war effort (which the French were subsidising) or relations with England and Denmark by supporting Sweden.¹²³ At the time, Henri IV only offered to mediate the conflict between Karl and Sigismund.¹²⁴

118 RR, Karl IX to Robert Cecil 26 October 1605, Karl IX to James Spens October 1605, Karl IX to Richard Barker 26 October 1605.

119 Riksarkivet, *Diplomatica Gallica*, vol. 548, Philip Scheding's and Erik Elfsson's receipt for a letter to the King of France 25 November 1605; RR, Karl IX to Cornelius Corneliusson 12 November 1605.

120 *Diplomatica Gallica*, vol. 548, Offensive and defensive alliance between the King of France and the King of Sweden against Denmark and the Duchy of Cleves 1542, Letter from Henri IV to Johan III 1 June 1592.

121 Maillefer 1993, 99-114.

122 Grosjean 2003, 22-24; Åberg 1990, 91; Murdoch 2003, 22-24; Miller 2007, 83-84.

123 Petitot 1822, 29-31, Messieurs Jeannin et de Russy au Roi de France 2 December 1607, 347, Monsieur Jeannin à Monsieur de Villeroi 1 August 1608, 368-372, Monsieur de Villeroi à Monsieur Jeannin 8 April 1608, 464-471, Le Roi à messieurs Jeannin et de Russy 23 May 1608.

124 RR, Karl IX to Henrik Franklin 20 February 1606, Karl IX to Philip Scheding and Hans Nilsson 10 March 1606.

Karl IX did not seem perturbed by these rebuttals. Correspondence with King James ceased for the time being, but Karl remained convinced that Spens would manage relations and succeed with recruitment. A more regular correspondence was maintained with Henri IV, whom Karl kept informed of French colonels employed.¹²⁵ However, for the time being, Swedish diplomatic efforts were mainly aimed at enabling recruitment within the United Provinces, and at gaining the support of powerful magnates in France and Scotland.

Diplomatic relations with the United Provinces

Unlike in the British Isles and in France, Karl IX had a diplomatic presence in the United Provinces from the start, in the form of his commissaries. Though much of the commissaries' task was to manage recruitment and finances, they were also charged with conducting negotiations with the various powerholders. In many ways these roles overlapped. For example, the sale of copper to the Admiralty of Holland was tied to the right to export soldiers and military equipment, providing the Admiralty with a vested interest to lend political support.¹²⁶

However, despite numerous supporters and a general sympathy for the Protestant cause emphasised by Karl, the Dutch proved reluctant to allow recruitment. The chief concern of Grand Pensionary Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and the States General was the war against Spain, which hung in the balance. In particular, the so-called 'war party' headed by Maurice of Nassau, commander of the army, was very much against competition with their own recruitment efforts. The Dutch were also concerned about experienced officers and soldiers defecting to the Swedish army, which was said to offer better terms, or to use this as leverage in wage disputes within the Dutch army.¹²⁷ After several rounds of negotiations in 1606, the best the Swedish commissaries could manage was permission to recruit two companies with a promise of more the following year. In return, the Swedes agreed to sell 500 skeppund of copper, and more in 1607. Although illicit recruitment continued, the bulk of Swedish efforts were postponed.¹²⁸

125 LatRR, Karl IX to Henri IV 2 April 1607, 10 June 1607, 4 July 1607, 26 August 1607, 3 February 1608, 8 March 1608, 10 March 1608, 8 December 1608 and 28 January 1610.

126 *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 11 May 1606 and 31 May 1606.

127 Ten Raa and De Bas 1913, 81-82.

128 *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 31 May 1606, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 4 August 1607; Riksarkivet, *Diplomatica Hollandica*, vol. 1037, *Passeport för svenska kommissarierna och det af dem värfvade krigsfolket* 4 June 1606; RR, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 9 July 1606, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling, Johan Jörenssohn and Erich Jörenssohn 15 July 1606, Karl IX to Hans Claesson 4 September 1606.

Unfortunately for the Swedes, the Dutch remained reluctant the following year as well. Recruitment itself gained momentum, but without official support the men could not be exported. It was at this point that the French recruiters, probably encountering or sensing these difficulties, proposed the shipping operation from Emden. With the Dutch unwilling to support the Emden operation for political reasons, export again turned to Amsterdam. However, the States General refused to provide passports for the units and the whole operation, including timing of the muster and paying already levied troops, was jeopardised.¹²⁹

Negotiations continued throughout 1607 and well into 1608. The commissaries tried to discuss the matter privately with both Oldenbarnevelt and Maurice of Nassau, as well as more formally with the States General. The Count of Hohenlohe, a magnate in Swedish service, and the recruiting officers themselves, also petitioned for the Swedish cause, but to no avail. In the autumn a complete ban on military exports was put in place, and in April 1608 at least some of the recruiters were ordered to leave the country.¹³⁰

The Dutch authorities' control was far from complete, however. Many officers continued operations within the United Provinces. Despite the ban, hundreds of troops were smuggled out by ship, or by marching across the border and seeking transport from Emden or northern France.¹³¹ Nonetheless, Dutch opposition continued to cause difficulties, not least because of the uncertainty and challenges of coordination this entailed, but also because financing the operation revolved around Amsterdam. These problems were not fully resolved until after the Dutch-Spanish 'Twelve Years' Truce' was signed 9 April 1609.

Support from France and the British Isles

Having been rebuked by King James and Henri IV, Karl IX put more effort into winning over the Scottish and French high nobility instead. Besides their

129 *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 4 August 1607, 14 October 1607 and 4 November 1607; StK, Jacob De la Gardie to Karl IX 9 November 1607; RR, Karl IX to Hans Nilsson and Augustino Cassiodoro 28 February 1608.

130 *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 4 August 1607, 4 November 1607 and 7 November 1607; RR, Karl IX's instructions for Hans Nilsson and Augustino Cassiodoro for their mission to the Netherlands 28 February 1608; StK, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 26 April 1608.

131 Thirty-five French cavalrymen arrived by ship from Amsterdam to Älvsborg 20 May 1608, and in December 1607 Jacques de Rogier managed to ship 192 men from Amsterdam on three separate ships, sent out over several weeks. Riksarkivet, Landskapshandlingar, Västergötlands handlingar vol. 1607:1; StK, Jacques de Rogier to Karl IX 18 February 1608, De Corbeille to Karl IX 23 May 1608, Josias Baron de Tessier to Karl IX 3 June 1608 and December 1608.

support for finding and vetting officers and recruits, these magnates could lend political weight to the operation on both regional and national levels. The Swedish cause found support among Protestant elites and in France dovetailed with the political interests of militant Huguenots.¹³² If the French and Stuart monarchs were not willing to endorse recruitment directly, it was hoped that through these contacts recruitment could proceed unofficially, as had occurred in the past.¹³³

In Scotland, this meant relying on James Spens succeeding on his own merits, and the influence of the Marquis of Huntly and the Earl of Orkney, in allowing Robert Kinnard, Thomas Kerr and William Stewart (and maybe others) to complete their own recruitments.¹³⁴ Karl IX had also fostered good relations with the Huguenot leadership over the years, including an attempt at a dynastic alliance with the Duke of Rohan.¹³⁵ Although the alliance had failed to materialise, Rohan continued to support the recruitment politically. Châtillon too aided the venture by recommending his clients, passing on information, and negotiating with recruiters and civil authorities on behalf of the Swedish king.¹³⁶ Finally, the Swedish king warmed up relations with the Duke of Bouillon who, as marshal of France and Prince of Sedan, was well-placed to assist the Swedish venture politically and to recommend officers from his private army, which the duke was in the process of discharging at the time.¹³⁷

In spite of the local support provided by these magnates, by 1608 it had become clear that further diplomatic measures were required. The intransigence of the Dutch meant that the operation shifted south to France itself. Not only would recruitment have to take place there, but the men would also have to be quartered within the realm, as shipping was planned

132 James 2002 ; Racaut 2002.

133 Grosjean 2003, 15-17.

134 LatRR, Karl IX to the Marquis of Huntly 21 January 1607 and 17 July 1607, Karl IX to Thomas Kerr 17 July 1607, Patent for Robert Kinnard 18 November 1607, Karl IX to William Stewart 17 November 1607, 9 January 1608 and 7 April 1608, Karl IX to the Earl of Orkney 9 January 1608; StK, William Stewart to Karl IX 21 April 1608.

135 *Diplomatica Gallica* vol. 548, Letters relating to the marriage proposal between Henri de Rohan and princess Catherine 1599-1600; *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon*, Åke Kromnow: Katarina, <https://sok.riksarkivet.se/sbl/Presentation.aspx?id=11393>, accessed 19 August 2021.

136 RR, Karl IX to Monsieur de Chatillon 27 December 1605; LatRR, Karl IX to Monsieur de Chatillon 18 June 1607, 20 August 1607 and 18 October 1607; *Diplomatica Hollandica* vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 31 May 1606, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 23 September 1607; Ten Raa and De Bas 1913, 409.

137 Ten Raa and De Bas 1913, 81-83; LatRR, Karl IX to Henri Duke of Bouillon 4 April 1607, 8 March 1608 and 9 March 1608; RR, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 7 April 1607; *Diplomatica Gallica* vol. 548, Jacob van Dyck to Karl IX 22 March 1608; *Militieräkningar*, 1609/11.

to take place from the ports of Dieppe, Calais or La Rochelle.¹³⁸ This shift in focus increased the need to involve French authorities and, ultimately, gain permission from Henri IV.

Around the same time, recruitment in the British Isles reached a crisis point. James Spens's operation had proceeded slowly, and by summer 1607 Karl IX no longer believed the Scotsman's excuses of pestilence or other factors causing delays. The King accused Spens of betrayal, which soon deteriorated into a distrust of all Scots. However, at some point in 1608 it became apparent that the root of the troubles was resistance from King James, and diplomatic efforts were redoubled.¹³⁹

In August 1607 Colonel Regis de Vernet was dispatched to present Henri IV with Karl IX's letter professing amity and mutual assistance, and asking permission to recruit a regiment for Swedish service.¹⁴⁰ The mission met with limited success, and a more formal embassy followed, including Colonel de la Borde and headed by Doctor Jacob van Dijck, newly appointed Swedish ambassador to the United Provinces and France.¹⁴¹ The aim of this second delegation was not merely to gain recruiting rights, but to reaffirm the treaty of 1542 and establish a proper military alliance between Sweden and France.¹⁴²

The mission was delayed until February 1608 due to the onset of winter and war in the Netherlands. Though Henri IV received the Swedish delegation amicably, military assistance became a contentious issue at court. The Jesuits, a number of Catholic magnates, and the Polish ambassador were vehemently opposed, while the King, his principal ministers and Huguenot magnates were in favour.¹⁴³ Negotiations continued for several months, and a resolution was not reached until spring. Although an official alliance was still not possible, the King gave his blessing for the venture against the enemies of France. De la Borde, Vernet and others received the

138 Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, vol. 7, Överste De la Bordes villkor för värvning av sitt regemente 1608; RR, Karl IX to Tessier 13 September 1608.

139 RR, Karl IX to Evert Horn and Hans Nilsson 12 July 1607, Karl IX to Söftring Jönsson 19 August 1606; LatRR, Karl IX to Wilhelm Stewart 17 November 1607, Karl IX to James Spens 26 January 1607, 29 May 1607 and 28 June 1608.

140 Diplomatica Hollandica vol. 1, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 4 August 1607; StK, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 13 August 1607.

141 RR, Karl IX to Henrik Horn, Anders Haraldsson and Henrik Eriksson 5 September 1607.

142 RR, Karl IX to the King of France 9 July 1607 and 26 August 1607; StK, Regis de Vernet to Karl IX 13 August 1607, Henri de la Borde to Karl IX 2 December 1607; Diplomatica Hollandica vol. 1, Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 23 September 1607; Petitot 1822, 29-31, 115, Messieurs Jeannin et de Russy au Roi de France 2 December 1607 and 25 December 1607.

143 Diplomatica Gallica vol. 548, Jacob van Dijck to Karl IX 22 March 1608; StK, La Borde to Karl IX 22 May 1608 and 6 June 1608; Petitot 1822, 365-368, Lettre du Roi Henri IV à Messieurs Jeannin et de Russy 8 April 1608, 368-372, M.de Villeroy à M. Jeannin 8 April 1608.

right to recruit as many French subjects as required. Subsequent recruiters still had to seek approval from the French monarch, but henceforth Swedish recruitments in France continued without issue.¹⁴⁴

The rapprochement with James VI & I began later and proceeded more slowly. In a series of letters to the British monarch, Karl IX emphasized commercial ties between the countries and promised special privileges to Stuart subjects trading in Sweden. With Polish-Lithuanian involvement in a Russian civil war, Karl was quick to stress the chaos and damage caused by Sigismund's actions, promising merchants trading with Muscovy safe conduct through Swedish territory. In April 1609 Karl sent his counterpart a gift of falcons and when James reciprocated by giving a religious treatise, the Swedish king once again emphasized the common struggle against Sigismund's counter-reformatory zeal.¹⁴⁵

Concurrent with this exchange of letters, a diplomatic mission similar to the one sent to France was prepared for 1609. James Spens, recently made commander of all 'English and Scottish' troops in Swedish service was appointed to lead the delegation. To lend weight to the mission Spens was accompanied by eight other recruiters. Besides the main objective of enabling recruitment, Spens had a broader goal of improving Stuart-Vasa relations, including a proposal for Prince Gustav Adolf to marry Princess Elizabeth Stuart. As in France, the British mission was a success. Spens and his officers gained the right to levy Stuart subjects, and the embassy helped normalise relations. A year later, another embassy led by Baron Johan Skytte and Count Gustav Stenbock followed, which solidified this success with formal recognition for Karl IX's kingship and the Stuart monarch's guarantee to prevent Sigismund from levying troops in the British Isles.¹⁴⁶

Without the concerted efforts of Karl IX, Swedish diplomats, the recruiters and their magnate supporters, recruitment from Western Europe would not have been possible. However, it should be noted that negotiating the permission to recruit troops was not uniquely a Swedish success but also a way for foreign monarchs to assert their sovereignty, broker power, and gain politically. Henri IV and James VI & I maintained the right to recall their subjects and became guarantors of the recruitment contracts, thereby

144 StK, Tessier to Karl IX 3 June 1608; *La Continuation du Mercure François* 1615, 49-56; Petitot 1822, 365-368 Roi Henri IV à messieurs Jeannin et de Russy 8 April 1608, 368-372 Monsieur de Villeroy à Monsieur Jeannin 8 April 1608, 347 Monsieur Jeannin à Monsieur de Villeroy 1 August 1608.

145 LatRR, Karl IX to James VI & I 21 March 1608, 28 June 1608, 20 October 1608, 21 April 1609, 2 May 1609 and 22 September 1609.

146 LatRR, Karl IX to James Spens 28 June 1608, 7 October 1608 and 17 December 1608; Lewenhaupt 1903, *Calendaria Caroli IX* 7 June 1608; Grosjean 2003, 26-28.

providing security for both the Swedish monarch and recruiters if either side should fail in their obligations. This went a long way to foster trust between the parties and was perhaps demanded by some recruiters once disagreements over payments arose. Furthermore, with the blessing of their sovereigns, the officers and soldiers would continue to be loyal subjects and auxiliaries with all the security and social prestige that entailed, rather than masterless mercenaries.¹⁴⁷

Conclusion

Twenty years later, in 1629, Gustav II Adolf initiated another large recruitment operation in anticipation of Swedish involvement in the Thirty Years' War. The pattern was familiar from the earlier recruitment of 1605-1610. Sir James Spens was again provided with a hefty advance payment and entrusted with recruiting up to 12,000 English and Scottish troops. Royal agents were also sent to Amsterdam to purchase military supplies and recruit men. Within months 4,000 soldiers awaited shipping from Emden and tens of thousands of muskets, suits of armour, barrels of gunpowder and other materials were obtained through established Dutch-Swedish mercantile networks. Although disagreements with the States General again caused trouble, this time the Swedish king was better informed of the political climate and had resident ambassadors in place in London and the Hague to smooth these out. By the time of his landing at Peenemünde in 1630, the King's armies included over 33,000 foreign troops, around 45 % of the total military establishment, with tens of thousands more recruited over the next few years.¹⁴⁸

What enabled the smooth operation of this later recruitment were the experience, administrative practices and networks established during the transformative recruitment of 1605-1610. As this article has demonstrated, overseas recruitment on this magnitude was a complex operation, involving not only the sourcing of men and material, but also major financial and diplomatic endeavours. Each of these elements - military, fiscal and diplomatic - had to be addressed together to get the men, money and transports in the right place at the right time. The main challenges were due to poor coordination and communication, lack of resources and difficulty

147 StK, La Borde to Karl IX 22 May 1608 and 6 June 1608; Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, vol. 7, Överste De la Bordes villkor för värvning av sitt regemente 1608; *La Continuation du Mercure François* 1615, 49-56.

148 Barkman 1936, 235-237, 263-265, Bilaga 8; Grosjean 2001, 152-153; Murdoch and Grosjean 2014, 36, 54; Klerk 2020, 224-225.

in transferring funds, lack of trust between participants, and opposition by foreign administrations.

To overcome these problems, the Swedish Crown needed trusted partners with good access to international military, economic and social networks. Officers capable of sourcing men and equipment, usually through sub-contracting, were needed to outfit the units. For financing the operation, the Swedish Crown relied on international merchants adept at selling raw materials, able to transfer funds with bills of exchange and ready to advance credit to smooth over logistical difficulties. Finally, foreign magnates were sought to assist with recruitment, to lend political support, and to increase trust between the parties by acting as guarantors of the endeavour.

The Crown preferred to use established networks of recruiters and financiers, with their advantages of established practices and lines of communication, as well as greater trust and credit between the partners, which made operational management easier. For similar reasons, the Crown sought to concentrate processes in the hands of a small number of large contractors: colonels rather than captains and the Gothenburg Trade Company rather than individual small merchants.

However, the unprecedented scale of the operation meant that traditional channels of recruitment and financing proved insufficient. Existing networks had to be enlarged, and completely new ones formed. In the British Isles, Karl IX attempted to deal with new recruiters using the same *modus operandi* that had worked in the past: employing existing contacts to help new recruiters locally, without official approval. When this failed to work, the King incorporated similar methods to those used to establish new recruitment networks in the United Provinces and France. Support was sought from the high nobility, who proved pivotal in finding recruiters, supporting and enabling recruitment operations on a local level and petitioning on the Swedes' behalf at the centres of power. Nonetheless, recruitment in the British Isles remained more independent than across the Channel where Swedish commissaries and equipment purveyors assumed an active role.

Most of the individual recruitments undertaken in the period 1605-1610 encountered difficulties. Large commissions proved difficult and costly to achieve, while distrust and conflict around payment and delivery prevented the completion of contracts. Resolving these issues required negotiation, compromise and trust. Many recruitment contracts were adapted and re-affirmed, while terms of service were more carefully specified and became standardised. Obligations for recruiters to provide arms and armour were

eased. Finally, permission was sought from James VI & I and Henri IV. The monarchs asserted their sovereignty by approving and guaranteeing the contracts for both Karl IX and the recruiters, which went a long way to building trust between the parties.

Although the recruitment of 1605-1610 was chaotic and seemingly inefficient, it was also a great success. Starting with little and threatened with invasion, Sweden managed to develop a working fiscal-military recruitment organisation and establish new networks across the North Sea. Some 7,000-9,000 soldiers and large quantities of military supplies were procured from private markets in Western Europe, which enabled the Swedish army to rebuild itself and continue its military engagements and imperial expansion. The operation also acted as a catalyst for economic and diplomatic developments, such as the re-forging of diplomatic relations with western powers, the introduction of the first resident ambassadors, the development of the city of Gothenburg and the establishment of Sweden's first chartered trade company. Militarily, economically and diplomatically Sweden became increasingly connected and dependent on cooperation with foreign states and non-state actors in what can only be described as a milestone in the development of the Swedish contractor state.

Appendix 1: Recruitment commissions issued 1605-1610

Date issued (source)	Recruiter	Troops: no. and type	Area of recruitment ¹⁴⁹	Key terms of recruitment contract	Completed?
26.10.1605 (RR)	James Spens	1600 infantry, 600 cavalry	(Scotland)	1600 dalers / 200 men, advance payment of part.	Yes. Most delayed to 1610-1612
26.10.1605 (RR)	Richard Barker	'Several thousand' men	England	1600 dalers / 200 men, as many companies as can recruit.	No
27.12.1605 (RR)	Monsieur Chatillon	200 + 1000 infantry	French army in the United Provinces	Chatillon appointed Karl IX's lieutenant, asked to recruit a company and to find officers to recruit 1.000 more men.	No
25.03.1606 (RR) ¹⁵⁰	Francois de Serrant	100-200 infantry	United Provinces	800 dalers / 100 men. Arrival by summer 1606.	No
27.04.1606 (RR) ¹⁵¹	David Reigner	200 infantry	United Provinces	1600 dalers / 200 men. Arrival by summer 1606.	No
17.05.1606 (Diplomatica Hollandica) ¹⁵²	Monsieur de Coullonges	800 infantry 'already in service'	United Provinces		No
27.05.1606 (Diplomatica Hollandica, StK) ¹⁵³	Don Rodrigo de Córdoba	2 x 200 infantry	(United Provinces)	1600 daler / 200 men and 600 daler for Córdoba. Half-pay in advance. Pays all expenses until Sweden. Swedes provide ships.	Yes
26.09.1606 (LatRR)	Bertrand du Carrane, Sieur de Pipiers	2 x 200 infantry	France, Belgium or elsewhere	1600 dalers / 200 men.	
26.09.1606 (LatRR)	Regis du Vernet	3 x 120 cavalry	France and Belgium	26 dalers per man, arquebusiers. Arrival by spring 1607.	Yes, mostly in 1608

149 As given in commission. Locations in parentheses inferred from other sources.

150 Mentioned in RR, Karl IX to Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson 25 March 1606.

151 Mentioned in RR, Karl IX to Ståthollare i Älvsborg 27 April 1606.

152 Mentioned as commissioned and with 800 recruits ready on 17 May 1606 in Diplomatica Hollandica vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 31 May 1606.

153 StK, Don Rodrigo de Córdoba y Guzman to Karl IX 27 May 1606; Diplomatica Hollandica vol. 1, Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson to Karl IX 31 May 1606.

26.09.1606 (LatRR)	Jean d'Azemar, Sieur de Sueilles	1000 infantry, 500 cavalry	France, Belgium or elsewhere		No. Sueilles killed whilst recruiting. ¹⁵⁴
14.01.1607 (LatRR)	Monsieur la Rivallier	300 infantry	France or where possible	2800 dalers per month. Arrival by early spring 1607.	
16.01.1607 (LatRR)	Charles de la Vilette	300 cavalry	France, Belgium or elsewhere	26 dalers / soldier. Fully armed & armoured with saddles. Horses provided by Swedes. Swedes arrange shipping. Arrival by early spring 1607.	Yes, mostly in 1608
21.01.1607 (LatRR)	Robert Kinnaid	200 cavalry	Scotland	2630 dalers per month. Fully armed and armoured with saddles. Horses provided by Swedes 'as is the French and Belgian custom'.	At least partially
18.03.1607 (LatRR)	Robert Kinnaid	300 infantry	Scotland	To be well armed. Arrival by spring 1608	At least partially
April 1607 (LatRR)	Pierre de Trauconis	150 cavalry	France	26 dalers per man, of which half paid up-front to cover transport and quartering.	Yes, 1607
10.04.1607 (RR)	David Spens	Company of Scottish cavalry	Sweden	Order to recruit discharged Scottish cavalrymen already residing in Sweden.	Yes
21.04.1607 (LatRR)	Petrus de la Lemand, Sieur de Casteguison	120 cavalry	France	Same terms as La Vilette (above). Ordered to join Vernet and La Vilette.	Yes
18.06.1607 (LatRR)	De la Borde de Luxe	5 x 100 cavalry (cuirassiers)	France	Same terms as La Vilette (above). Arrival by summer 1607.	Partial, 1608-1609
17.07.1607 (LatRR) ¹⁵⁵	Thomas Kerr	Infantry and cavalry	Scotland		Partial? ¹⁵⁶

154 Some of Sueilles's recruits apparently entered Swedish service after the colonel's death under Regis de Vernet; StK, De Bonaille to Karl IX 3 July 1608.

155 LatRR, Karl IX to the Marquis of Huntly 17 July 1607.

156 There was a ryttmästare (captain) Karr with Evert Horn's army 1610.

14.7.1607 (LatRR) ¹⁵⁷	Josiah de Tessier	500 cavalry (cuirassiers)	France	Same terms as La Vilette (above). 28.2.1608 mention of an additional 200 arquebusiers. Arrival by autumn 1607 or spring 1608.	Allegedly October 1609
Late 1607 or early 1608? (StK) ¹⁵⁸	Bernard Sasoubre	4 x 120 cavalry	France		At least partially
1607? (StK) ¹⁵⁹	Jacques de Rogier	200+ (infantry?)	(France and United Provinces)		Yes
09.01.1608 (LatRR) ¹⁶⁰	William Stewart + Robert Stewart	1000 + 1000 infantry	Scotland, England, (Ireland)	Initially 1.000 infantry, later addition of 500 cavalry and finally described as 2.000 'men'. Arrival by 10 May 1608.	Yes, mainly 1609-1610
1607 or 1608 (StK)	Arthur Forbes	Cavalry company	(United Provinces)		No, Forbes pulled out
03.09.1608 (LatRR)	De la Borde de Luxe	1000 infantry and 376 cavalry	France	Supplement to previous contract. Cavalry those not delivered yet and infantry is a new regiment. 26 daler paid per cavalryman and 8.000 daler for 1.000 infantry. No arms or armament required. Swedish shipping.	No
1608 (SSNE 4177, 1721)	William Ruthven	A troop of Scottish soldiers	Scotland	Ruthven named colonel of the troops he would recruit.	
20.01.1609 (LatRR)	Pierre de la Ville	200 or 300 cavalry	France	12 daler per cavalryman, reinforcements for existing unit. Arrival by early spring 1609.	Yes

157 LatRR, 17 July 1607, 1 March 1608, 12 May 1608, 27 June 1608, 3 August 1608, 3 January 1609, 18 April 1609; StK, Tessier to Karl IX 27 December 1608, 28 July 1609; RR, Karl IX to Duke Johan 20 October 1609; RR, Karl IX to Hans Nilsson and Augustino Cassiodoro 28 February 1608.

158 Sasoubre offered to recruit four companies in an undated letter and is a colonel by 1608. StK, Bernhardus Sasouer to Karl IX; French captains to Karl IX 25 October 1608; RR, Karl IX to French cavalry 9 June 1608.

159 StK, Jacques de Rogier to Karl IX 18 February 1608, Abraham Cabiljau to Karl IX 18 February 1608.

160 LatRR, Karl IX to William Stewart 9 January 1608, 7 April 1608, 26 February 1609, 6 September 1609 and 18 January 1610, Karl IX to Robert Stewart 24 February 1609.

20.01.1609 (LatRR)	Bertrand Mondesier	120 cavalry	France	12 daler per cavalryman. Reinforcements for existing units? Arrival by early spring 1609.	Yes
01.02.1609 (LatRR)	Robert Sim / Patrick Rutherford	200 infantry	British Isles	8 daler per soldier. Reinforcements for Patrick Rutherford's Scottish unit recruited by Robert Sim. Arrival by early spring 1609.	Yes
12.04.1609 (LatRR)	George de Romeyn and Domarge de Bontans	200 cavalry	France	'All costs to be covered'. Reinforcements for Regis de Vernet's regiment. Arrival as soon as possible.	At least partially
15.08.1609 (LatRR)	Petrus de Saint Coullon	Company of French cavalry	(France)		
30.01.1610 (LatRR)	Louis de Goth, Marquis de Rouillac	1000 cavalry	France	'All costs to be covered'. Recruited without arms and armour. De Goth named commander of all the French. Arrival by spring 1610.	No

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